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Barbara Jordan once said: “What the people want is sim-ple.  They want an America as good as its promise.’’  Thesame can be said of what this nation wants of its courts.
They want a court—they want a judiciary—as good as its
promise.    I have developed this theme before.1 I expand on
that discussion here as an introduction to this special Court
Review issue on judicial independence because the key to the
preservation of the independence of the judiciary is to give to
the public courts that are responsive, efficient, and caring.
Nearly 100 years ago, Roscoe Pound gave his famous speech
entitled “The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice.”2 Pound spoke of three things that
contributed to the dissatisfaction he perceived during his time:
first, a belief by the people that the administration of justice is
easy; second, the historical tension between the branches of
government; and, finally, what he described as the sporting
theory of justice.  While Pound’s focus was on why the public
was dissatisfied, it is axiomatic that the causes of the popular
dissatisfaction with the administration of justice are the fuel
for present threats to judicial independence.  Simply put, we
have not effectively met the fundamental challenge of reducing
the causes of popular dissatisfaction with justice and, until we
are more effective in meeting this challenge, the independence
of the judiciary will remain at risk.  
Today the dissatisfaction with the administration of justice
is at a level that none of us should tolerate or accept because it
threatens our democracy as much as any terrorist.  Thus, the
nation’s dissatisfaction with the administration of justice is a
central issue of homeland security.  
We are not alone: the American people have had their con-
fidence shaken in their most important institutions.  Churches
plagued with sex abuse scandals and the failure of major cor-
porate institutions like Enron and Arthur Anderson illustrate
the challenge the judiciary faces.  Given the shaken public
faith in many critical institutions, simply saying the judiciary
is a separate, equal, and historically important branch of gov-
ernment will not resonate with the American people.  Judicial
independence is not an end in itself, but a means to preserve
the values of our democracy.  
Judicial independence has two forms:  decisional indepen-
dence and institutional independence.  The freedom to self-gov-
ern and to think and act free from external bias also has a duty
that comes part and parcel with it.  The duty courts owe is to be
accountable to the people. To be accountable is an easy and
straightforward covenant between the judiciary and the people.
Roscoe Pound’s second factor that he said contributed to the
dissatisfaction with the administration of justice was political
jealousy by the other branches of government with the judi-
ciary due to judicial review—the doctrine that courts have the
final say as to what the constitution means.  At about the same
time as Pound’s speech, ABA President Jacob M. Dickinson
observed that “[j]udicial judgments are not accorded the same
respect as formerly.”3 He continued: “Political parties of all
creeds have bowed their heads in recognition of a discontent.”4
The consequence, Dickinson warned, was “to destroy confi-
dence in the courts and to make a subservient judiciary.”5
Today it is fair to say that too many of our colleagues in the
executive and legislative branches have the same jealousies as
their predecessors 100 years ago.  Unfortunately, some politi-
cal leaders not only are too easily prone to cry about judicial
tyranny when there is disagreement with the outcome of a
case, but also have made careers out of fostering public mis-
understanding of the role of courts.  
All of us—in the courts and the community at large—pay
the price for public misconceptions about the courts.  While
there is far more trust and satisfaction with the court system
than judicial critics might lead one to believe, it is easy to feel
a bit under siege at times.  To maintain perspective about
where the issue of judicial independence is today, though, we
must realize that judicial independence has been challenged by
the other two branches of the government from the very begin-
ning of our nation’s history.  
In 1795, the Senate rejected the permanent appointment of
John Rutledge as a Supreme Court justice due to a speech
given by Rutledge during his temporary commission on the
Supreme Court as a recess appointee.  In 1805, Justice Samuel
Chase was impeached by the House of Representatives.
(Fortunately, the Senate failed to convict when it became
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apparent that Chase’s opponents were after him not because he
had committed any wrongdoing, but merely because the House
disagreed with his decisions.)  Chief Justice John Marshall,
who today is revered, was nearly impeached in an effort fos-
tered by Thomas Jefferson.  Marshall, not having the benefit of
a bar association fair response committee nor even a court
public information officer, was forced to respond to his critics
by writing a series of letters to the editor, using a pseudonym.
Nearly a century later, President Theodore Roosevelt, upset
with a ruling from the Supreme Court, said of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes that he could carve a judge out of a banana
with more backbone than the backbone of Holmes.  Senator
Robert LaFollette characterized all federal judges as “petty
tyrants and arrogant despots.”  President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, who referred to the Supreme Court Justices as “nine
old men” with a “horse and buggy mentality,” tried unsuccess-
fully to pack the Supreme Court.  Billboards populated parts of
the nation demanding the impeachment of Chief Justice Earl
Warren.  And former President Gerald Ford at one time wanted
to impeach Justice William Douglas. 
Every era of American history presents unique challenges
for those committed to preserving judicial independence.  The
way we conduct public debate on the issues of our present era
contributes to undermining the public’s confidence in govern-
ment and the courts in particular.  Regrettably, too often the
current method of policy disagreement is to take the other per-
son’s idea, mischaracterize it, and then announce one’s pro-
found outrage and disagreement.  While that style of debate
might be entertaining for talk radio commentators, it con-
tributes to our nation’s bewilderment as to whether all issues
are so susceptible to reduction to all black and all white.
Not only is our political rhetoric poisonously divisive at
times, our nation is divided as well.  That division contributes
to the difficulty we have in responding effectively to the popu-
lar dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.  The social
historian Gertrude Himmelfarb described us as “one nation,
two cultures,” one more religious, traditional, and patriotic; the
other more secular, tolerant, and multicultural.6 It should be
no surprise that a polarized nation is also conflicted when it
comes to a vision what the justice system should look like.  
Throughout our nation’s history, the public’s confidence and
trust in government has ebbed and flowed.  Today we live in an
era where there is significant erosion of confidence in govern-
ment.  The erosion of confidence is exemplified by one of for-
mer President Ronald Reagan’s most memorable phrases in his
1981 inaugural address: “[G]overnment is not the solution to
our problem.  Government is
the problem”7 For courts to
maintain the public’s confi-
dence, we need to be far more
cognizant about the times in
which we live.  As the ABA
Commission on Separation of
Powers and Judicial
Independence stated, “A public
that does not trust its judges to
exercise sound, evenhanded,
independent judgment is a
problem to be eradicated,
rather than a virtue to be proud.”8
The polls consistently show a decline in the public’s per-
ception of how responsive the government is to the public’s
concerns.  Courts cannot derive their policies from watching
polls, but to maintain judicial independence, courts need to be
responsive and need to listen.  Not many judicial leaders quote
Jimi Hendrix, but it might be worthwhile:  “Knowledge speaks,
but wisdom listens.”9
The judiciary has always faced issues that were politically
contentious.  In Brown v. Board of Education,10 the judiciary
spoke with a single voice and contributed to making the liberty
that our founders wrote of a reality for all Americans.  To be
sure, there was a short-term price and threats of retaliation.
For example, on March 13, 1957, the state of Georgia, by joint
resolution of the Georgia General Assembly, requested the ini-
tiation of impeachment proceedings against six Supreme Court
Justices (Warren, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and
Clark) for their decision in Brown.  With the present debates
about gay marriage, tort reform, and crime, there is a danger
that judicial independence could suffer a serious blow, in part
because of the public belief that courts and judges are political
branches of government not in the tradition of which
Hamilton wrote.  A study conducted by the National Center for
State Courts found that nearly 80% of the public believe that
judges’ decisions are influenced by political considerations.11
Today’s assault on “activist judges” by conservatives may
focus on decisions like Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health,12 a
decision which the highest court in Massachusetts held uncon-
stitutional that state’s ban on gay marriage.  But the history of
the judiciary is littered with cases that offend liberals as well.
In the early part of the 20th century, the United States Supreme
Court found worker protections unconstitutional.13 The Dred
Scott decision,14 which struck down a ban on slavery in the ter-
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ritories, illustrates that a judi-
ciary that has the power to do
good also has the power to do
evil.    When these types of
decisions are issued, the wis-
dom of the courts is certainly
fair game for public criticism.
As long as courts continue to
serve as the forum to resolve
society’s most contentious
issues, judges can expect to
be criticized and criticized
harshly.  While it might sting,
principled criticism of partic-
ular decisions of the judiciary
is no threat to judicial independence.
No one should be so naïve as to expect universal agreement
on the issues that face the courts.  While the judiciary is virtu-
ally united when the attack on judicial independence comes
from external political forces, the fact is that those of us in the
judicial branch will and should have our own disagreements
on the vision of justice we each seek.  But we must express our
disagreement in a manner that fosters public confidence.
Unfortunately, the judiciary and the leaders of the bar at times
contribute to the popular dissatisfaction with the administra-
tion of justice.  Too often judicial leaders who should know
better forget Justice Learned Hand’s admonition that the spirit
of liberty is the spirit that is not too sure that it is right.
Pound’s speech identified a third cause of dissatisfaction
with the administration of justice, which he labeled as the
sporting theory of justice.  The sporting theory of justice is the
view that the legal process is essentially two modern gladiators
in a pitted war, with the role of the judge to be simply a referee
for the combat.  Even today, the sporting theory of justice is so
rooted in the legal profession in America that many of us take
it for a fundamental legal tenet.  Pound argued that the sport-
ing theory of justice disfigures our judicial administration at
every point.  It leads the most conscientious judge to believe
that he or she is merely to decide the contest, as attorneys pre-
sent it, according to the rules of the game, and not to search
independently for truth and justice.  It leads attorneys to for-
get that they are officers of the court and instead leads them to
deal with the rules of law and procedure exactly as the profes-
sional football coach deals with the rules of the sport.  In the
final analysis, the sporting theory of justice leads critics of the
legal profession like former Vice President Daniel Quayle to
say, “All lawyers are worthless.”
In order for the judiciary to maintain its rightful place in
our democracy, we must move away from the sporting theory
of justice.  To do so does not by implication destroy or threaten
the adversary system: it strengthens it.  Judges and lawyers
must move from recycling problems to resolving them with the
best thinking of the courts and communities.  Courts need to
exercise leadership and connect the resources within our com-
munities with the issues facing us in drug court, mental health
court, family court, or in how we respond to issues of race and
diversity.  The current catchwords are “problem-solving
courts” and “therapeutic justice.”  Regardless of the label, if
courts want to insure their relevance to the people, the courts
of the future require partnerships with the other helping pro-
fessions and the public at large.  That is how we can truly pre-
serve the judicial branch’s independence.  Constructive inter-
dependence will protect judicial independence.
The popular dissatisfaction with the administration of jus-
tice is not fueled just by rhetoric, but by performance.  The
best strategy for preserving and enhancing the independence
of the judiciary is to enhance the judiciary’s performance.  For
some understandable reasons, courts have differentiated them-
selves from the private sector and its business practices.  We
say that courts neither control the influx of cases nor the laws
that create them, that due process is intrinsically inefficient,
and that the administration of justice is complex and, there-
fore, not amenable to modern management practices.  The
unfortunate consequence of these and other such arguments is
that most courts can articulate what does not work, but have
not designed quality initiatives that do work in what is asserted
to be the unique culture of the court.  
Although there are nearly 28,000 state and local judges who
can champion a renewed public confidence in our courts, there
are even more court employees.  Those employees must also be
enlisted in the campaign to preserve the judicial branch’s inde-
pendence.  To create a judiciary as good as its promise, court
leaders need to communicate to court employees the vision of
what we expect the judiciary to be.  Community outreach
begins in the courthouse.  Yet not all courts understand the
importance their own employees play in being responsive, effi-
cient, and caring.  A strong partnership between judges and
employees is essential.  Court employees need to feel a part of
the team and to be able to offer constructive criticism to foster
change.  Viewing the judge as a deity is not healthy for anyone
involved in court administration.  In the relationship judges
have with court administrators and employees, judges must
remember we were appointed, perhaps elected, but never
anointed.  
The challenge to maintaining judicial independence is made
more difficult with the fiscal crisis that confronts too many
courts.  But this is not a new challenge, either.  Shortly after the
lower federal courts were established in 1789, the Federalist
lame duck, President John Adams, and the Federalist lame-
duck Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, which estab-
lished 16 new circuit judgeships.  The following year, the new
Republican President, Thomas Jefferson, and the Republican
Senate passed legislation eliminating the new judgeships.  The
political branches used their constitutionally given regulatory
authority over the courts to make the ultimate budget cut—the
elimination of judgeships.  If John Adams and Thomas
Jefferson could have great constitutional quarrels over the fate
of the judiciary’s budget, then we need to accept that such bat-
tles will occasionally occur between the political mortals of our
day, too.
The ability of legislatures to determine the judicial branch’s
budget is seen by some as “one of the greatest threats to judi-
cial independence.”  One need not belabor the point by rehash-
ing what has happened to many courts.  Oregon’s recent four-
day work week, the Federal District Court in Washington
D.C.’s threat to do the same, or canceling civil jury trials as
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many states have done speak volumes of the critical position
many courts are in.  However, a lack of money is not an excuse
for a lack of ideas.  Courts must be willing to innovate if we are
to effectively address the popular dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice.
Part of the challenge that budget issues present to courts is
our image.  Well-run public institutions are well-funded.
Others are told to do more with less.  Because courts have not
been able to succinctly articulate the key performance mea-
sures that will make them effective, we have contributed to our
own crisis.  As professor Doris Marie Provine said, in a some-
what different context:
A tradition of concern for preservation of the sov-
ereignty of judges circumscribes policy initiatives at
each level.  In our country judicial independence
means not just freedom from control by the other
branches of government, but freedom from control by
other judges.  This ideal of autonomous judges, with
roots deep in American legal culture, powerfully influ-
ences contemporary debates about efficiency and
accountability within the judicial branch.15
Judicial leaders need to confront the issue—efficiency and
accountability are the foundations of adequate and stable fund-
ing and the willingness of the other branches.
Courts need to acknowledge that, in part due to our own
failures, we are no longer a monopoly as the sole provider of
justice services.  Because our “service” did not always quickly
and affordably meet the consumer needs, other providers of
justice were formed.  Administrative law processes, rent-a-
judge, and private arbitration, to mention a few, take some of
the work away from an already overburdened system, and as
such there is no reason to feel threatened.  But there is a lesson
to be learned.  The truth is that rarely do courts deal with the
great social issues that are fodder for radio talk show com-
mentary.  The nearly 100 million cases in state courts will
almost never be heard about outside of the courthouse.  They
are cases involving contract disputes, small claims, personal
injury, juvenile law and family law, and not particularly sensa-
tional criminal cases.  All of those cases have a common
thread—they are important to the litigants, and those litigants
deserve individual attention.  An independent judiciary pro-
vides to these litigants a court system that is responsive, effi-
cient, and caring.
Courts depend on public cooperation for their effectiveness.
Social scientists have long known that people’s reactions to the
legal authorities are based in large part on their assessment of
the fairness of the process by which legal authorities make
decisions and treat members of the public.16 The willingness
to accept and obey the orders of the judiciary is strongly linked
to people’s evaluations of the procedural justice of the courts.
Cooperation, consent, and buy-in are words tossed about in
other walks of life, but they are critical when it comes to hav-
ing a healthy system of justice.
Respect is also critical for
courts.  No matter what nation
they live in, people accept the
directives of judges only when
they believe such authorities
are entitled to respect.  One
only need look at the fragility
of court respect in other
nations to see just how fortu-
nate we in this nation are.
For the judiciary to be truly
responsive, independent, and fair, the public must be willing to
accept the use of discretion by judges.  In democratic societies
such as the United States, the line between an abridgment of
personal freedom and a legitimate policing activity is often
controversial and contested.  Hence, one important issue is the
degree to which the public is willing to empower the judiciary
to make tough decisions in close cases.
When the public is unwilling to give courts the discretion
to make judgments, the actions of judges are constrained and
are often not fair for anyone.  Concern about bias in sentenc-
ing by judges is a reasonable concern, but the concern has, at
times, led to the use of sentencing guidelines that unduly con-
strain judges’ behavior.  Concern about leniency in sentencing
is reasonable, but has, at times, led to mandatory sentencing
laws that can be very unfair to particular defendants.  
Social science studies have found that there are two types of
factors that shape people’s deference to legal authorities during
personal encounters.  The first is obviously linked to out-
comes.  People’s willingness to accept judicial decisions is
based in part on the degree to which they regard the outcome
as being fair or favorable.  However, outcomes do not paint a
total picture of satisfaction.  Procedural fairness counts even
more.
A court that is as good as its promise is known not just for
speed and efficiency, but also for other, less quantifiable
aspects of justice—things like fairness and respect, attention to
human equality, a focus on careful listening, and a demand that
people leave our courts understanding our orders.  Courts can-
not be satisfied with being quick.  Nor can we be satisfied with
being clever.  To preserve the judiciary’s independence, we
must strive to be fully just to every person who leaves the 
courthouse.  
The volume of work makes individual attention to justice
seem at times to be an unattainable goal and so we rest on mea-
suring our speed.  There is a saying that what you measure is
what you care about.  To more effectively address the popular
dissatisfaction with the administration of justice, courts must
measure and be accountable for the fairness of our process.  
Courts that are committed to accountability and to the
proposition that you can have articulable performance mea-
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often, judges have accepted the notion that 50% of the time we
rule against the people and, therefore, the maximum level of
satisfaction is 50%.  Actually, 100% of the people can be dis-
satisfied with the process.  Most judges and virtually all of the
continuing judicial education focuses on getting it right.
Getting it right is critical, but it does not significantly explain
satisfaction with judges or the court system.  Courts cannot
expect to maintain public confidence if both the winner and
loser leave the courthouse dissatisfied with the process and
treatment to which they were subjected.  
In this most difficult of times for the judiciary, we need to
speak with a single voice and ask these key questions:
• How just and impartial were the procedures?
• Did the judge appear to have sufficient information to
support the decision?
• Did the judge take all of the evidence into account?
• Did the judge listen to each side of the story?
• Did the judge take enough time to consider the case care-
fully?
• Was the judge apparently unbiased?
Most importantly, judges need to directly confront the
notion that although judges at every level must be neutral,
neutrality does not dictate that we mask that we care about the
people and issues that come before us.  
The questions posed seem simple, and perhaps that is why,
although Roscoe Pound, as profound as his observations were,
got the first point wrong in his speech.  Contrary to his argu-
ment, the administration of justice is, in fact, pretty easy.
It is not trite to say that the courts play an indispensable
role in preserving democracy.  They most definitely do.  Any
particular case we hear may not have great historical effect, but
each case is a crucial human event.  Taken together, the deci-
sions we make day in and day out have the potential to affirm
the public’s faith in the strength of democracy—or to shake
that faith.  If courts give the people what they want, then and
only then will courts gain the public trust and respect—and
preserve their proper constitutional independence.  What the
people want is simple.  They want a court—they want a judi-
ciary—as good as its promise.
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